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Abstract
This paper studies the problem of random assignment with fractional endowments. Fractional
endowments complicate matters because the assignment has to make an agent weakly better off
than his endowment. I first formulate an exchange economy that resembles the random assign-
ment problem and prove the existence of competitive equilibrium in this economy. I then propose
a pseudo-market mechanism for the random assignment problem that is based on the competitive
equilibrium. This mechanism is individually rational, Pareto Optimal and justified envy-free but
not incentive compatible.
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1. Introduction
I consider the random assignment problem with fractional endowment, i.e., how to proba-
bilistically assign a number of objects to a number of agents in an efficient and fair manner while
respecting individual rationality constraints arising from fractional private endowments. My solu-
tion uses the concept of competitive equilibrium, and is related to two prominent existing results
on competitive equilibrium in the assignment problem, as well as certain special settings in school
choice.
When each agent only has strict preferences over deterministic assignments and owns a dis-
tinct entire house, the assignment problem parallels the housing market model first analyzed by
Shapley and Scarf (1974). In this model the houses are considered indivisible, and, given prices,
each agent uses the market value of his house to buy his most-preferred affordable house. A com-
petitive equilibrium consists of prices that clear the market and the associated allocation. Roth
and Postlewaite (1977) show that for the housing market a competitive equilibrium exists and is
unique. The competitive equilibrium allocation is ex-post efficient, individually rational and can
be implemented truthfully through the prominent Top Trading Cycles algorithm (Roth, 1982).
In the environment where each agent has cardinal utility for each house and compares prob-
abilistic assignments through Von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) expected utility and no agent
1Email: lp3ides@gmail.com. Website: https://sites.google.com/site/lp3ides. Present address: 208 S Arnaz Dr.,
Apt. A, Beverly Hills, CA 90211. I gratefully acknowledge the E. S. Shaw and B.F. Haley Fellowship from the Stanford
Institute for Economic Policy Research.
owns any house, Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) propose the Competitive Equilibrium from Equal
Incomes (CEEI) solution. The houses are infinitely divisible and each allocation corresponds to
a random assignment. The authors construct an economy in which, given prices, agents use an
exogenous strictly positive income to purchase a utility-maximizing probability distribution over
the houses. A competitive equilibrium consists of prices of the houses that clear the market, and
the corresponding allocation. The authors show that a competitive equilibrium always exists and
propose the pseudo-market mechanism for the assignment problem as follows. First, elicit cardi-
nal utilities of the agents. Second, give agents the same incomes, simulate the market and compute
the competitive equilibrium. Their pseudo-market mechanism is ex-ante efficient, envy-free, but
not strategy-proof.
In my setting, the houses are also infinitely divisible, and each agent still evaluates random
assignments using his vNM expected utility, but the endowment structure is more general: each
agent can own probability shares of houses and there might be house shares not owned by any
agent. In my solution, I first distribute the unowned houses among the agents and set up an
exchange economy in which, given prices, agents use the market value of their endowments to
purchase a utility maximizing probability distribution over the houses. A competitive equilibrium
consists of prices of the houses that clear the market, and the corresponding allocation. My main
result is that given strictly positive endowments, a competitive equilibrium exists. If endowments
are not strictly positive, however, I can still guarantee the existence of an approximate competitive
equilibrium.
My results generalize the existing ones on competitive equilibrium in the assignment prob-
lem, with and without divisibility. In my environment, when the endowment structure is such
that each agent owns a distinct entire house, there exists a unique competitive allocation (with di-
visibility) whose allocation is unique and coincides with that of the unique competitive allocation
with indivisibility. When no agent owns any house, the distribution of unowned houses evenly
among the agents is equivalent to giving agents equal incomes, so my existence result implies the
existence of CEEI.
My results also allow for the design of a pseudo-market mechanism for the assignment prob-
lem that accommodates endowment structures more general than those amenable to Top Trading
Cycles and CEEI. In the pseudo-market mechanism, I first elicit from the agents their cardinal util-
ities over the houses. I then distribute the unowned houses evenly among the agents and compute
the competitive equilibrium. The resulting allocation will be ex-ante efficient, individually ratio-
nal and justified envy-free. My pseudo-market mechanism improves upon that by Hylland and
Zeckhauser (1979) since it satisfies individual rationality constraints arising from private endow-
ments, and collapses to the CEEI outcome when there is no private endowments. It also improves
upon Top Trading Cycles by allowing for fractional private endowments, and collapses to the Top
Trading Cycles outcome when each agent owns a distinct entire house. However, the mechanism
is not strategy-proof.
The current paper is related to the literature on house allocation with existing tenants/private
endowments. Abdulkadirog˘lu and Sönmez (1999) first study the house allocation problem with
existing tenants, a setting that captures the endowment structures in both Shapley and Scarf (1974)
(only existing tenants) and Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) (only new applicants) as two polar
cases. The authors propose the top trading cycles mechanism from random orderings as a solution,
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and show that this mechanism is efficient, individually rational and incentive compatible. More-
over, this mechanism reduces to the competitive mechanism (based on top trading cycles) in the
first model, and to random serial dictatorship in the second model. While Abdulkadirog˘lu and
Sönmez (1999) use the ex-post notion of efficiency and individual rationality, the current paper
uses the ex-ante notion. In addition, their top trading cycles mechanism is incentive compatible
but my pseudo-market mechanism is not.
The current paper’s setting of fractional endowments has been analyzed by Athanassoglou
and Sethuraman (2011). There are important differences between their analysis and the current
paper. First, they use ordinal efficiency, a notion based on stochastic dominance that only relies
on ordinal utility. Ordinal efficiency was first proposed by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) who
propose the probabilistic serial solution to the random assignment problem, which is then gener-
alized to the 0-1 endowment case by Yılmaz (2010). My paper uses ex-ante efficiency which relies
on cardinal utility. Second, their notion of justified envy, first proposed by Yılmaz (2010), is con-
straint by individual rationality requirement: an agent i’s envy of another agent j’s assignment is
justified only when giving agent i’s assignment to agent j does not make agent j worse off than
his initial endowment. My notion of justified envy only relies on the agents’ initial endowments:
agent i’s envy of agent j’s assignment is justified if agent i’s initial endowment is weakly greater
than agent j’s initial endowment. Third, their proposed solution is a constructive algorithm based
on network flows, whereas my pseudo-market mechanism uses a non-constructive fixed point
argument.
The current paper also has some connection to the school choice literature. In a school choice
problem, students need to be assigned to schools. Students have preferences over schools, and
schools have priorities over students (see Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 2003, and the references
therein). In general, a matching algorithm is applied to strict preferences and priorities to yield
a deterministic assignment. However, when schools do not have any intrinsic priorities over
students (or when priorities are coarse (Erdil and Ergin, 2008; Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2011)), the
resolution of ties using a random lottery effectively leads to a random assignment. In other words,
the random assignment problem is a special case of the school choice problem where schools do
not have any intrinsic priorities.2 In addition, a recent strand in school choice literature highlights
the importance of using cardinal preferences and cardinal welfare. Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2011,
2015) show that cardinal preferences can operate through the Boston mechanism to efficiently
resolve ties, leading to more efficient outcomes than the Deferred Acceptance algorithm (Gale and
Shapley, 1962) which ignores cardinal preferences. They propose the Choice Augmented Deferred
Acceptance algorithm that allows students to influence tie-breaking with their cardinal preferences.
The authors also argue that ex-ante efficiency captures the cardinal welfare of the participants,
which is an important issue when students’ preferences conflict and school priorities are not strict.
My model and results have applications in environments in which agents have fractional en-
dowments, such as on-campus housing (Athanassoglou and Sethuraman, 2011). Fractional en-
dowment of an object can be interpreted as the probability of actually getting the object. For
example, in the on-campus housing setting it could represent some sort of priority or claim a
student has over a certain room. Another interpretation of fractional endowments comes from
thinking of objects as actually being divisible goods. This interpretation is particularly suitable in
2I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this connection.
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environments where time-sharing is possible (Athanassoglou and Sethuraman, 2011). For exam-
ple, a computer cluster can be used by many programs at different times over the course of a day.
Fractional endowment then is the amount of time in a day a program is entitled to run on the com-
puter cluster. In contrast to the case of indivisible goods where a random assignment is viewed
as a lottery over deterministic consumptions, in time-sharing applications a random assignment
describes how much time an agent can consume a good (see Athanassoglou and Sethuraman,
2011).
The pseudo-market mechanism can also be viewed as a way to improve upon a given lottery
(Athanassoglou and Sethuraman, 2011). Suppose that a random assignment has been proposed
as a solution. One can think of this proposed random assignment as fractional endowments, and
apply the pseudo-market mechanism to find a new random assignment that is efficient and po-
tentially Pareto-dominates the proposed solution. In time-sharing environments one can similarly
improve upon an existing allocation.
Methodologically, I make use of an existing technique to overcome the problem of demand
discontinuity: instead of requiring each agent to consume a probability distribution over the ob-
jects, I only require them to consume a sub-probability distribution over the objects (see Budish
et al., 2013). This relaxation gives the desirable continuity properties of demand, and also an in-
terpretation of individual rationality arising from fractional endowments. A fixed point theorem
is then used to show the existence of competitive equilibrium, at which market-clearing implies
that each agent is now consuming a proper probability distribution. The allocation at compet-
itive equilibrium must therefore be a random assignment, which can be shown to be efficient,
individually rational and justified envy-free.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the environment. Section 3
establishes the existence of competitive equilibrium and relates it to the case of indivisible goods.
Section 4 addresses some of the assumptions made in earlier sections, as well as points out several
extensions of the model. Section 5 proposes a mechanism based on the competitive equilibrium
results. Section 6 concludes.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. The environment
There is a set of houses H = {1,2, ..., H}, one of each, to be assigned to a set of agents I =
{1,2, ..., I}, where I = H. I denote a generic agent by i and a generic house by h. Each agent i has
cardinal utility uih for house h. Let u
i = (uih)h∈H denote agent i’s preferences, and let u = (u
i)i∈I
denote the profile of preferences. Assume that uih > 0 for all i, h. Let U i be the set of preferences of
agent i. Let U = (U i)i∈I be the set of preference profiles.
The consumption space of each agent i is the set of sub-probability distributions over the
houses Qi = {qi = (qi1, ...,qiH) ∈ RH+ : ∑h∈H qih ≤ 1}. Consuming a proper probability distribution
has the obvious interpretation as getting a lottery over the houses. Consuming a sub-probability
distribution can be interpreted in time-sharing contexts as the duration in which an agent can
consume a good (Athanassoglou and Sethuraman, 2011); it can also be interpreted as a lottery in
which there is non-zero probability of getting no house at all. This can arise in settings where
there are more agents than houses. Each agent i evaluates a consumption qi ∈ Qi through his
“expected” utility qiui = ∑h∈H qihu
i
h.
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Agent i’s endowment of house h is denoted by eih. Let e
i = (ei1, ..., e
i
H) be agent i’s endowment.
I assume that ∑h∈H eih ≤ 1 for all i, so that an agent’s endowment is always in his consumption
set. For feasibility of endowment, I require that eih ≥ 0 for all i, h, and that ∑i∈I eih ≤ 1 for all
h. Let e = (ei)i∈I be the profile of endowments and let E be the set of endowment profiles. An
endowment profile e is strictly positive if eih > 0 for all i, h.
The set of allocations is Q = {q = (q1, ...,qI) : qi ∈ Qi for each i}. An allocation q is feasible if
∑i∈I qih ≤ 1 for all h. An allocation q is a random assignment if ∑i∈I qih = 1 for all h. A deterministic
assignment is a random assignment q in which for each agent i there is a house h such that qih = 1
and qih′ = 0 for all h
′ 6= h. Note that at a random assignment q, it must be that ∑h∈H qih = 1 for
all i, so each agent’s consumption bundle is a proper probability distribution over the houses. A
random assignment q can be represented as a I×H bistochastic matrix where qih is the entry in the
ith row and hth column. A deterministic assignment can be represented as a permutation matrix.
By the Birkhoff (1946) - Von Neumann (1953) theorem, any random assignment can be obtained
as a lottery over deterministic assignments. LetR be the set of all random assignments.
A random assignment problem is completely described by the pair (u, e). A solution to the
random assignment is a mapping φ : U × E →R.
To facilitate exposition, I assume that preferences are strict: for all i, uih 6= uih′ for any h 6= h′ and
that endowments are complete: ∑i∈I eih = 1 for all h. Unless stated otherwise, these assumptions are
being made. They are relaxed in section 4.
2.2. Desirable properties of a solution
Given a random assignment problem (u, e), the following concepts are standard. An allocation
is efficient if there is no allocation at which all agents are weakly better off and at least one agent
is strictly better off. An allocation is weakly efficient if there is no allocation at which all agents are
strictly better off.
Definition 1. An allocation q is efficient if there exists no random assignment qˆ such that qˆiui ≥ qiui for
all i, with strict equality for at least some agent i.
Definition 2. An allocation q is weakly efficient if there exists no random assignment q such that qˆiui >
qiui for all i.
To make an agent willing to change to a new assignment, it must be that the new assignment
is at least as good for the agent as his endowment. An allocation that has this property is called
individually rational (IR).
Definition 3. An allocation q is individually rational if qiui ≥ eiui for all i.
Depending on the application, individual rationality has different interpretations. In the hous-
ing market model of Shapley and Scarf (1974), each agent’s endowment is a discrete house which
he can consume, so individual rationality has the natural interpretation as an agent’s property
rights. In the lottery-improvement context, though no agent can realize the lottery by himself, he
may be entitled to the current lottery that he has. For example, in dorm-room assignment, a stu-
dent may request that his chances of getting certain rooms be unchanged. In the case of divisible
goods, like time-sharing contexts, individual rationality has the interpretation of property rights.
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Envy-freeness, the central axiom of fairness, is incompatible with individual rationality. For
example, if preferences are strict and identical across all agents, and one agent is endowed with his
most preferred house, then any individually rational solution must give this house to this agent,
but such a solution is not envy-free. I relax envy-freeness to justified envy-freeness, which requires
that if agent 1’s endowments are weakly more than agent 2’s, then agent 1must not strictly prefer
agent 2’s lottery. This notion of fairness is perhaps the most natural in my setting.
Definition 4. A random assignment q is justified envy-free if for any two agents i and j, ei ≥ ej implies
that qiui ≥ qjui.
2.3. Competitive equilibrium
Given a complete endowment profile e and preference profile u, imagine an exchange econ-
omy that is made up of the same set of goods (houses) H and the same set of agents I with the
same set of preferences u over the same consumption space (Qi)i∈I and the same profile of en-
dowments e. In this exchange economy, agent i’s endowment is ei, and given market prices, he
can sell his endowment to buy a sub-probability distribution that maximizes his utility. A com-
petitive equilibrium consists of prices and a feasible allocation that is individually optimal for the
agents given prices.
For ease of exposition, I will first define the competitive equilibrium with budgets in which an
agent’s wealth consists of his endowment and an exogenous non-negative budget. Let a budget
vector b = (bi, ...,bI) ∈ RI+ be given. I write b = 0 to mean bi = 0 for all i. Similarly, b > 0 means
bi > 0 for all i. Let the set of price vectors be the H-simplex:
P = {p = (p1, ..., pH) ∈RH+ : ∑
h∈H
ph = 1}.
Define an agent’s choice set as
Fi(p, e,b) = {qi = (qi1, ...,qiH) ∈RH+ : ∑
h∈H
qih ≤ 1 and qi p ≤ ei p + bi}.
An agent’s choice set is the set of bundles of goods which do not add up to more than one in
total and do not cost more than his wealth. In other words, his choice set is the set of affordable
sub-probability distributions. His demand correspondence is
φi(p, e,b) = argmax
qi∈Fi(p,e,b)
qiui,
that is, he chooses the utility-maximizing bundle(s) from his choice set.
Definition 5. A competitive equilibrium with budgets b is a price vector p and random assignment q =
(qi)i∈I such that given p, for each agent i, qi ∈ φi(p, e,b).
An agent’s demand correspondence consists of the optimal affordable sub-probability dis-
tributions.3 Though the definition does not require any agent to consume a proper probability
3Since the desired allocation is a random assignment, I could have imposed the restriction that each agent must
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distribution, the requirement that the allocation is a random assignment ensures that every agent
consumes a proper probability distribution.
A competitive equilibrium in the usual sense (without the extra budgets) is simply a competi-
tive equilibrium with a budget vector that is identically zero.
Definition 6. A competitive equilibrium is a price vector p and random assignment q = (qi)i∈I such that
given p, for each agent i, qi ∈ φi(p, e,0).
Sometimes the existence of competitive equilibrium is not guaranteed, but an approximate com-
petitive equilibrium might exist. An e−approximate competitive equilibrium consists of prices and
individual demands such that aggregate demand for any house does not exceed aggregate en-
dowments by more than e.
Definition 7. For e > 0, an e-approximate competitive equilibrium with budgets b is a price vector p and
individual demands q = (qi)i∈I ,qi ∈ φi(p, e,b) for all i such that |∑i∈I qih − 1| < e for all h.
3. Competitive equilibrium
3.1. Existence theorems
I now show the results regarding the existence of competitive equilibrium. I first construct
a price-demand correspondence that is guaranteed to have a fixed point by Kakutani’s theorem,
then argue that the fixed point is a competitive equilibrium.
The aggregate demand correspondence is the sum of individual demands. I abuse notation
and write q also to denote aggregate demand.
ΦD(p, e,b) = {q : ∃ (qi)i∈I such that qi ∈ φi(p, e,b) for each i and ∑
i∈I
qi = q}.
The range of ΦD is the convex compact set :
D = {q = (q1, ...,qH) ∈RH+ : ∑
h∈H
qh ≤ H}.
Define the price player correspondence ΦP : D→ P to be:
ΦP(q) = argmax
p∈P
p(q−~1H),
where~1H is a vector of length H with all entries being one that represents the aggregate resource
of the economy. The term (q−~1H) in the definition is called excess demand. The price player, given
excess demand at the old price vector, sets a new price vector that maximizes the value of excess
demand. It is convenient to note that the price player ensures that a house has non-zero price
consume a proper probability distribution. However, relaxing this restriction by letting each agent consume a sub-
probability distribution yields good continuity properties. Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) imposes the restriction
and tackle the continuity problem by always having some zero-priced house in the market, but consequently have to
transform the price space to attain convexity and compactness.
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if and only if its excess demand is maximal among all the houses. In particular, note that unless
excess demand is the same for all houses, the price player will set the price of some house to zero.
For a given endowment profile e and budgets b, define the correspondence Φ : P×D→ P×D
by:
Φ(p,q) = (ΦP(q),ΦD(p, e,b)).
The term (ei p + bi) is called agent i’s wealth. Given a budget vector b, the aggregate wealth of
the economy at any price p is ∑i∈I ei p + bi = 1+∑i∈I bi.
This fixed point approach is quite commonly used in establishing existence of competitive
equilibrium. The only points of departure are: (1) the requirement that each consumption bundle
must be a sub-probability distribution and (2) an agent’s wealth comes from his endowment and
an exogenous budget.
One condition necessary for Kakutani’s fixed point theorem is upper hemi-continuity of de-
mand in prices. The definition of competitive equilibrium requires that each agent consume a
proper probability distribution. However, if this is imposed on demand by restricting the con-
sumption space to the hyperplane ∑h∈H qih = 1 then the choice set is not continuous in prices,
leading to demand being not upper hemi-continuous in prices.4 The relaxation of the choice set
to include sub-probability distribution eliminates this discontinuity issue and greatly simplifies
the analysis.
Lemma 1. If ei p + bi > 0 for all p then the correspondence Fi(p, e,b) is continuous in p.
Proof. See appendix.
The continuity of the choice set, coupled with the linearity and continuity of vNM utility
functions, gives the following result via the theorem of the maximum.
Lemma 2. If ei p + bi > 0 for all p, then Φi is non-empty, convex-valued, and upper hemi-continuous in
prices.
The aggregate demand correspondence ΦD is hence upper hemi-continuous. It is also non-
empty and convex-valued. The corresponding properties of the price player correspondence are
easy to establish. Therefore, Φ is a non-empty, convex-valued upper hemi-continuous correspon-
dence from a non-empty convex compact subset to itself, so by Kakutani’s theorem Φ has a fixed
point. Denote the fixed point price by p(e,b) and the associated consumption bundles of the
agents by q(e,b) = (qi(e,b))i∈I .
Strictly positive endowment is sufficient to guarantee strictly positive wealth even when the
budget vector is identically zero, and hence the existence of a fixed point (p(e,0),q(e,0). It can be
shown that at this fixed point the market clears, so it is a competitive equilibrium.
Theorem 1. If endowment is strictly positive, then a competitive equilibrium exists. The corresponding
random assignment is efficient, individually rational and justified envy-free.
4For example, consider a simple setting where there are two houses A and B and an agent is endowed with 12 of
each house. The agent strictly prefers house A to house B. Suppose that the agent can only buy proper probability
distributions over A and B. Consider the price sequence pA = 1 + e, pB = 1− e with e going to zero. At each small
e> 0 the agent cannot buy more than 12 of house A, and demand is (qA,qB) = (
1
2 ,
1
2 ). However, at the limit when e= 0,
the choice set expands to include all combinations, and demand jumps discontinuously to (qA,qB) = (1,0)
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Proof. Strictly positive endowment guarantees the existence of fixed point (p(e,0),q(e,0)). I now
argue that this fixed point is market-clearing, i.e., q(e,0) =~1H. In this proof, excess demand of house
h means that qh(e,0) > 1, and excess supply of house h means that qh(e,0) < 1. Note that because
of zero budgets, aggregate wealth is one.
Step 1: There is no excess demand. Suppose in negation that there is excess demand of some
houses. Let K denote set of houses in maximal excess demand. The price player must set the
prices of houses outsideK to be zero, and the prices of houses inK to sum to one. Excess demand
then implies that aggregate expenditure is strictly greater than one, i.e., p(e,0)q(e,0) > 1. But this
means that aggregate expenditure exceeds aggregate wealth, a contradiction.
Step 2: There is no excess supply. Suppose that there is excess supply. Consider two cases: (1)
some prices are zero, or (2) all prices are strictly positive. If there is some zero-priced house, then
each agent i’s consumption bundle must sum up to one since it is costless to consume this zero-
priced house. So collectively all agents consume a total of I house shares. Since I = H, no excess
demand then means that there is no excess supply.
If prices are all strictly positive, then excess supply of a house implies equal excess supply
for every house (otherwise the price player will set some price to zero). Consequently, aggre-
gate expenditure is less than one, i.e., p(e,0)q(e,0) < 1, so the total wealth of the economy is not
exhausted. Therefore there is at least some agent i who does not use up his wealth. Strict pref-
erences implies that this agent gets his most preferred house in its entirety. But this implies no
excess supply of this house, a contradiction.
So at price p(e,0) there is no excess demand and no excess supply, which means that the
market clears exactly. So I agents consume H houses in total at the fixed point. Since each agent’s
consumption bundle adds up to one or less, it must be the case that each agent’s consumption
bundle adds up to exactly one, i.e., each agent is consuming a proper probability distribution.
q(e,0) is therefore a random assignment. (p(e,0),q(e,0)) is a competitive equilibrium with zero
budgets, so it must be a competitive equilibrium as well.
Efficiency can be shown via the usual revealed preference argument. Note that strict prefer-
ences imply that if qˆiui ≥ qiui then it must be that qˆi p ≥ qi p. This is not true if preferences are not
strict because an agent may be choosing an optimal bundle that is not necessarily the cheapest.
The fact that agents are optimizing from choice sets given by their endowments ensures justi-
fied envy-freeness and individual rationality.
Theorem 1 can be used to prove a result that is similar in spirit to that of Hylland and Zeck-
hauser (1979). If none of the agents has any endowments, I can give each of them some strictly
positive budget (normalized to sum to one) and let them use their budget to buy house shares
from some social auctioneer. A competitive equilibrium with budget is guaranteed to exist. The
intuition is that there is no fundamental difference between budget and endowment. Instead of
getting budget bi and no endowment, agent i can be endowed with endowment ei = bi~1H and no
budget. Since prices sum to one, the value of ei is always exactly bi. The agents now are endowed
with all the houses, and can trade among themselves instead of buying from the social auctioneer.
I have essentially transformed the CEEI setting to the exchange economy setting, and theorem 1
applies.
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Corollary 1. If endowment profile e is identically zero, then for any budgets b such that bi > 0 for all i and
∑i∈I bi = 1 there exists a competitive equilibrium with budgets b.
Theorem 1 requires the endowment profile to be strictly positive. A endowment profile that
is not strictly positive can cause discontinuity in demand at zero prices and so the existence of
a fixed point cannot be guaranteed. Additional budget solves this discontinuity problem, but
might lead to excess demand. However, there is a close relationship between the budgets and
excess demand which is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Given budget b > 0 the fixed point (p(e,b),q(e,b)) constitutes an e-approximate equilibrium
with budgets b where e = (H − 1)∑i∈I bi.
Proof. Consider the fixed point (p(e,b),q(e,b)) given endowment profile e and a budget vector b
with bi > 0 for all i. If there is no excess demand then by the same logic in the proof of theorem 1
there is no excess supply, and q(e,b)−~1H = 0.
Suppose there is excess demand. Let K be the set of houses with maximal excess demand
d, then the price player must set prices of houses in K to sum to one and all other prices to be
zero. Aggregate expenditure is then 1 + d, which must be bounded above by aggregate wealth
1+∑i∈I bi, so d ≤ ∑i∈I bi.
There must also be excess supply, otherwise excess demand for every good means I agents are
consuming more than I house shares in total which is infeasible. Therefore the price player must
set the prices of houses in excess supply to zero. Consequently each agent i’s consumption bundle
must sum up to one, leading to a total of I = H for all the agents. Consider any house h∗. Since
maximal excess demand is d, maximum total amount of shares possible from all the other houses
is (H− 1)(1+ d), so the minimum demand for house h∗ is H− (H− 1)(1+ d) = 1− (H− 1)d and
the maximum excess supply is therefore (H − 1)d, which, by the inequality from the preceding
paragraph, is bounded above by (H − 1)∑i∈I bi.
Therefore, maximal excess supply or demand is bounded by (H − 1)∑i∈I bi.
The relationship between the approximation error e and the budget vector implies that for any
e> 0 I can choose any budget vector b> 0 such that∑i∈I bi < 1H−1e to guarantee the existence of e-
approximate equilibrium with budget b. The fixed point (p(e,b),q(e,b)) is one such e-approximate
equilibrium. If one gives the agents equal budgets, then justified envy-freeness is ensured at the
approximate equilibrium allocation. This is summarized by the following result.
Theorem 2. Let e > 0 be given. Let b be such that bi = 1I
1
H−1e for all i. An e-approximate competi-
tive equilibrium with budget b exists. The corresponding allocation is efficient, individually rational and
justified envy-free.
A related result is given by Mas-Colell (1992) who show that, under much more general condi-
tions, a competitive with “slacks" (budgets) exists. His result, to be more precise, states that there
exists budgets that will sustain a competitive equilibrium. My result, however, states that for any
budget small enough, there will be an approximate competitive equilibrium with correspondingly
small approximation error.
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3.2. Relationship with competitive equilibrium with indivisibility
So far I have assumed that the houses are infinitely divisible. I now define the competitive
equilibrium with indivisibility for the setting where the houses are not divisible.
Definition 8. A competitive equilibrium with indivisibility is a price vector p and a deterministic
assignment m such that for each agent i, mi = argmaxh∈H,ph≤pei u
i
h.
An allocation associated with a competitive equilibrium with indivisibility is called a compet-
itive allocation with indivisibility. Roth and Postlewaite (1977) show that if preferences are strict
and endowment is discrete, a competitive allocation with indivisibility exists and is unique.
Theorem 3. (Roth and Postlewaite) If preference profile u is strict and endowment profile e is discrete,
then there exists a unique competitive allocation with indivisibility.
I show that if the endowment profile is discrete, then a competitive equilibrium with divisibil-
ity always exists and its allocation is unique and coincides with the unique competitive allocation
with indivisibility.
Theorem 4. If endowment profile e is discrete, then there exists a unique competitive allocation. Moreover,
it is the same as the unique competitive allocation with indivisibility.
Proof. See appendix.
The result suggests that the uniqueness of competitive allocation with indivisibility is not
due to indivisibility but due to the discrete endowment structure and the requirement that each
agent’s consumption bundle adds up to one.
4. Extensions
4.1. General preferences
The proof of theorem 1 makes it clear that the assumption of strict preferences is only used
to argue that market clears at the fixed point.5 When indifferences are present, one can always
perturb the profile of preferences to get strict preferences that are arbitrarily close to the original
preferences. The existence of competitive equilibrium at these perturbed preferences and a conti-
nuity argument can be used to establish that competitive equilibrium exists even when there are
indifferences.6
Theorem 5. Suppose that endowment is strictly positive. A competitive equilibrium exists with general
preferences. The corresponding random assignment is weakly efficient, individually rational and justified
envy-free.
5In fact, the only assumption really needed in the argument of the proof is that each agent has a unique house that
he values the most.
6This result does not contradict a counter example in Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979), which precludes the possibil-
ity of having different prices for identical houses.
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Proof. Let endowment be strictly positive. Let u be a profile of preferences with indifferences.
Consider the sequence of profile (um) converging to u such that um contains no indifferences for
each m. By theorem 1, for each um there exists a competitive equilibrium (pm,qm). Since the
sequence of competitive equilibria (pm,qm) is bounded, there exists a convergent subsequence
(pn,qn) that converges to, say, (p,q). I argue that (p,q) is a competitive equilibrium for preference
profile u.
qn is a random assignment for each n, so the limit q must also be a random assignment. I
need to show that qi ∈ φi(p, e,0) for each i, i.e., qi is agent i’s demand. I suppress agent index i for
notational ease. Since qn pn ≤ epn, at the limit it is true that qp ≤ ep, so q ∈ F(p, e,0). Consider any
other qˆ in F(p, e,0). I must show that qˆu≤ qu. By lower hemi-continuity of the choice set F(p, e,0)
in p and the assumption that qˆ ∈ F(p, e,0), there exists (pnk), a subsequence of (pn), such that there
is a sequence (qˆnk), with qˆnk ∈ F(pnk, e,0), converging to qˆ. Since qˆnk ∈ F(pnk, e,0), optimality of
(qnk) implies that qˆnkunk ≤ qnkunk. Therefore at the limit qˆu ≤ qu.
For each n, the allocation qn is efficient at un by theorem 1. Suppose that the limiting allocation
q is not weakly efficient at preferences u, then q is strictly Pareto-dominated by some qˆ at u. Since
(qn) converges to q and (un) to u, there is some n such that qn is also strictly Pareto-dominated by
qˆ at un, contradicting the efficiency of qn. Therefore q is weakly efficient.
Note that the usual proof approach using revealed preference does not work because of the
possibility of satiated agents, i.e., a weakly preferred bundle does not necessarily cost at least as
much if the agent is satiated and is not choosing the cheapest bundle.
Individual rationality and justified envy-freeness are established using revealed preference.
4.2. Incomplete endowment profile
I have been assuming that the endowment profile is complete, i.e., agents collectively own
all the houses. If endowment is not complete, then a competitive equilibrium is not guaranteed
to exist. It is easy to see that for the market to clear, total expenditure must be equal to total
cost of all the houses, which is 1 (prices are assumed to sum to 1). Therefore any house not
completely owned by the agents must have a price of zero in equilibrium. But if all the houses are
not completely owned then there must be no equilibrium.
There is, however, a simple solution to incomplete endowment. The goal of the social planner
is to distribute the houses in the best way possible, and competitive equilibrium is a means to that
end. The social planner can distribute the unowned houses evenly among the agents and use the
competitive equilibrium resulting from the modified endowment.
Theorem 6. Suppose that endowment is strictly positive and incomplete. Distribute the unowned houses
evenly among the agents to get a modified endowment. A competitive equilibrium exists at the modified
endowment. The corresponding allocation is efficient, individually rational and justified envy-free.
4.3. Under-capacity
Suppose that there are less houses than agents, i.e., I − H > 0. Obviously no random assign-
ment is feasible since there are more agents than houses, so the existing definition of competitive
equilibrium automatically implies that a competitive equilibrium does not exist. However, with
a slight and natural modification of the definition, much of the results hold true still.
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Definition 9. A competitive equilibrium with under-capacity is price vector p and allocation q = (qi)i∈I
such that ∑i∈I qih = 1 for all h and q
i ∈ φi(p, e,0) for all i.
A competitive equilibrium is now required to only be market-clearing, not a random assign-
ment. A proof identical to that of theorem 1 can be used to show the following result.
Theorem 7. If endowment is strictly positive, then a competitive equilibrium with under-capacity exists.
The corresponding allocation is efficient, individually rational and justified envy-free.
Proof. See appendix.
In a competitive equilibrium with under-capacity, some agents are not consuming a proper
probability distribution. These agents can be thought of as consuming a non-zero probability of
getting a null house, a house that yields no utility to any agent. A competitive equilibrium with
under-capacity (pu,qu) can also be thought of as a standard competitive equilibrium in which
 F = I − H null houses are added to the set of houses and given prices of zero.
 Non-null houses have the same prices as pu.
 Agents whose allocation at qu is not a proper probability distribution add the appropriate
amount of null house to their consumption to obtain a proper probability distribution.
4.4. Over-capacity
In the case of over-capacity, there are more houses than agents, i.e., H − I > 0. Naturally, no
random assignment can be market-clearing. A competitive equilibrium with over-capacity only
requires that each agent’s allocation is a proper probability distribution.
Definition 10. A competitive equilibrium with over-capacity is price vector p and allocation q = (qi)i∈I
such that ∑h∈H qih = 1 for all i and q
i ∈ φi(p, e,0) for all i.
Using a proof similar to the proof of theorem 1, it is easy to show that
Theorem 8. If endowment is strictly positive, then a competitive equilibrium with over-capacity exists.
The corresponding allocation is efficient, individually rational and justified envy-free.
Proof. See appendix.
A competitive equilibrium with over-capacity (po,qo) is equivalent to a standard competitive
equilibrium in which
 F = H − I fictitious agents are added to the set of agents, each of whom is given a positive
budget b f and is indifferent among all houses.
 Prices are the same as po.
 Non-fictitious agents’ allocations are the same as qo.
 Fictitious agents consume the houses not consumed by the non-fictitious agents.
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5. Application to the assignment problem
5.1. Mechanisms
The focus of the paper thus far has been on the existence and properties of competitive equi-
librium. The random assignment problem is, however, a mechanism design problem: the social
planner has to somehow assign house shares among the agents without knowing their prefer-
ences. By the revelation principle, the social planner can restrict attention to mechanisms where
he first elicits the preferences of the agent and then uses a systematic mapping from preferences
and endowment to random assignments. Such a mapping is a direct revelation mechanism. For-
mally, a mechanism is a mapping ϕ : (U × E) → 2Q that takes in an assignment problem and
returns a random assignment. In general, it is desirable that a mechanism is efficient, individu-
ally rational, justified envy-free and strategy-proof.
Definition 11. A mechanism ϕ is efficient, individually rational and justified envy-free if, for any as-
signment problem (u, e), the random assignment ϕ(u, e) is efficient, individually rational and justified
envy-free.
A direct mechanism is incentive compatible if truthful reporting of preferences is a dominant
strategy for each agent - misreporting preferences never benefits the agent regardless of the re-
ports of the other agents. In the current context, a mechanism is incentive compatible if misreport-
ing can never strictly improve the agent’s vNM utility. In the definition below, ϕi(u, e) denotes
agent i’s lottery at the allocation ϕ(u, e).
Definition 12. A mechanism ϕ is incentive compatible if for any agent i, ϕi(ui,u−i, e)ui ≥ ϕi(uˆi,u−i, e)ui
for all uˆi ∈ U i.
5.2. The pseudo-market mechanism
Consider the pseudo-market mechanism, which works as follows. First, the social planner
elicits preferences of the agents. Endowment is assumed to be public information. If endow-
ment e is not complete, he distributes the unowned house shares evenly among all agents to get a
complete, modified endowment profile. If the modified endowment profile is strict, by theorem 1
he can simulate the market for house shares and compute the competitive equilibrium allocation
which will be an efficient( weakly efficient if preferences exhibit indifferences), individually ratio-
nal and justified-envy free random assignment. The results regarding the extensions of the model
can be used to adapt the pseudo-market mechanism to accommodate under- and over-capacity.
If the modified endowment profile is not strictly positive, by theorem 2 he can give each agent the
same small positive budget and compute the e-approximate equilibrium allocation. Note that the
approximation error e can be made arbitrarily small by choosing arbitrarily small budgets.
In the case where there are many competitive equilibria, an arbitrary but consistent rule can
be used to determine which competitive equilibrium allocation will be used as the output of the
pseudo-market mechanism. For example, a simple rule can be: "Choose the allocation that is best
for agent 1. If there are many such allocations, choose among those the best for agent 2. If there
are many such allocations, choose among those the best for agent 3. And so on."
Since the pseudo-market mechanism outputs a competitive allocation, it is (weakly) efficient,
individually rational and justified envy-free. However, it is not strategy-proof. This is to be
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expected, since Zhou (1990) shows that there is no mechanism that is anonymous, efficient and
strategy proof. It is indeed possible for an agent to misreport to manipulate the equilibrium prices
and get a better lottery.
It is, however, worth noting that since the pseudo-market mechanism is based on competitive
equilibrium, it inherits certain incentive properties of competitive equilibrium. In particular, as
the number of agents becomes large through replication, the gain from misreporting goes to zero.
The interested reader can refer to Roberts and Postlewaite (1976) for the formal statements and
technical details. The intuition is as follows. To manipulate a mechanism based on competitive
equilibrium, an agent must manipulate prices. Because non-equilibrium prices give rise to excess
demand, the agent must, through misreporting of preferences, absorb excess demand to sustain
such prices as equilibrium prices. When the economy is replicated infinitely many times, however,
this excess demand, no matter how small, becomes too large for the agent to absorb. Therefore, in
the infinitely replicated economy, the only sustainable prices are indeed competitive equilibrium
prices. In a sense, prices become more and more exogenous to each agent. Given these prices and
public endowments, the choice set of each agent is exogenous, and so it is optimal for the agent
to report preferences truthfully.
6. Conclusion
The random assignment problem has attracted attention in recent years. While the notion of
ordinal efficiency is perhaps the most natural in many contexts (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001;
Yılmaz, 2010), in other contexts where utility is cardinal, ex-ante efficiency is a desired feature of
a solution. The possibility of fractional endowment (Athanassoglou and Sethuraman, 2011) calls
for a solution that is also individually rational and justified envy-free.
In this paper I provide a solution based on the concept of competitive equilibrium in an ex-
change economy that closely corresponds to the assignment problem with fractional endowment.
I first show that, under certain conditions, a competitive equilibrium exists and its allocation can
be used as a solution to the random assignment problem that satisfies ex-ante efficiency and in-
dividual rationality and justified envy-freeness. I also provide results when the conditions are
relaxed, as well as several extensions of the model such as under- and over-capacity and prefer-
ences exhibiting indifferences.
The results regarding competitive equilibrium are then used to design a pseudo-market so-
lution for the random assignment problem. Inheriting properties of competitive allocation, the
solution is ex-ante efficient, individually rational, justified envy-free but is not incentive compati-
ble.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Proof of lemma 1
I use the sequential characterization to show upper and lower hemi-continuity. For notational conve-
nience I suppress the i-superscript that indexes the agent.
For upper hemi-continuity, suppose that the sequence (pn) converges to p and the sequence (qn),qn ∈
F(pn, e,b) for each n, converges to q. I need to show that q ∈ F(p, e,b). This is straightforward. Since
∑h∈H qnh ≤ 1 for each n and (qn)→ q, it must be that ∑h∈H qh ≤ 1. Similarly, since qn pn ≤ epn + b, it must
be that qp ≤ ep + b.
For lower-hemicontinuity, suppose that (pn) converges to p and q ∈ F(p, e,b). I construct a sequence
qn such that qn ∈ F(pn, e,b) for all n and (qn) converges to q. If q ∈ F(pn, e,b) then let qn = q. Otherwise,
let qn = ep
n+b
qpn q. Since q /∈ F(pn, e,b), epn + b < qpn and hence ep
n+b
qpn < 1, so q
n is a valid sub-probability
distribution. By construction the cost of the bundle qn is exactly epn + b, so qn is affordable. Therefore
qn ∈ F(pn, e,b).
Since (pn)→ p, the ratio epn+bqpn < 1 converges to 1. So I have constructed a sequence (qn) such that
qn ∈ F(pn, e,b) for all n and (qn) converges to q.
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A.2. Proof of theorem 4
Step 1: A competitive equilibrium exists. By theorem 3, a competitive equilibrium with indivisibility, with
price p = (p1, ...pH) and a deterministic assignment m, exists. I now construct prices pˆ to support it as a
competitive equilibrium (allowing for divisibility) from the initial discrete endowment.
Relabel the houses so that p1 ≤ p2 ≤ ...≤ pH . PartitionH into disjoint sets of houses with the same price
H1,H2, ...,HT where T ≤ H so that H1 is the set of houses with the lowest price, H2 is the set of houses
with the second-lowest price, and so on. Let pˆ1 = 0, pˆ2 = 1, and for any 2≤ t ≤ T, construct pˆt such that
pˆt+1
pˆt
> max
i,i′ ,i′′∈I ,h,h′ ,h′′∈H
uih
ui′h′ − ui
′′
h′′
Assign price pˆt to the houses in Ht. The idea behind this construction is to ensure that the prices are such
that agent i can afford exactly the house mi, and houses more preferred than mi are too expensive and thus
not optimal to consume. I now show that given these prices pˆ, mi is agent i’s optimal bundle even if he can
consume random assignments.
Denote by UCSi(mi) = {h ∈ H : uih > uimi} and LCSi(mi) = {h ∈ H : uih < uimi} the upper and lower
contour sets of agent i at house mi. Consider any house h ∈ USCi(mi). By definition of competitive equi-
librium with indivisibility, ph > pmi , so if m
i is inHt and assigned price pˆt then h is inHt′ where t′ > t and
assigned price of at least pˆt+1. So the price of any house in UCSi(mi) is at least pˆt+1.
Consider agent i’s optimal bundle, given prices. If the bundle adds up to less than one, then the
agent must be consuming shares of the house h∗ with the maximum “bang for the buck” ratio, i.e., h∗ =
argmaxh∈H
uih
pˆh
. However, for all h ∈ UCS, uihpˆh ≤
uih
pˆt+1
<
ui
mi
pˆt by construction. So the agent does not consume
any house in UCS. Since he can afford mi, he must consume house mi entirely, contradicting the assumption
that he is consuming less than one house in total.
Suppose now that the optimal bundle adds up to exactly one, but the agent is consuming from both
UCSi(mi) and LCSi(mi).7 This is not optimal since the following change is welfare-improving. Reduce
consumption from UCSi(mi) by small e > 0, increase consumption of mi by pˆt+1pˆt e, reduce consumption of
LCSi(mi) by pˆt+1pˆt e. The resulting bundle is still feasible and affordable. The change in utility can be easily
verified to be positive.
So for each agent i, given prices pˆ, mi is his optimal bundle. ( pˆ,m) therefore constitutes a competitive
equilibrium (allowing for divisibility).
Step 2: Competitive equilibrium allocation is unique. Consider any competitive allocation resulting from
discrete endowment. Consider the set of houses with the lowest price. The agents endowed with these
houses, by budget constraint, must consume from these houses exclusively. This implies that these agents
exhaust these houses. Moreover, by strict preferences, their optimal bundles will be discrete, i.e., each agent
chooses his most preferred house among these lowest-priced houses.
Now consider the houses with the second-lowest price, and the agents who own them. Since the
lowest-priced houses have already been exhausted by their initial owners, these agents must not consume
from the lowest-priced houses. The same logic as above then implies that they exhaust the second-lowest-
priced houses, and that each agent’s consumption is discrete. This line of reasoning eventually implies that
the competitive equilibrium allocation must be a deterministic assignment. Therefore, any competitive al-
location must be a deterministic assignment. But any competitive equilibrium with deterministic allocation
is automatically a competitive equilibrium with indivisibility, which is unique.
7Other cases are simple. Mixing between mi and UCSi(mi) is not affordable. Mixing between mi and LCSi(mi) is
clearly sub-optimal.
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A.3. Proof of theorem 7
As mentioned in the main text, a competitive equilibrium with under-capacity (pu,qu) can also be
thought of as a standard competitive equilibrium with the following modifications.
 F = I − H null houses are added to the set of houses and given prices of zero.
 Non-null houses have the same prices as pu.
 Agents whose allocation at qu is not a proper probability distribution add the appropriate amount of
null house to their consumption to obtain a proper probability distribution.
This proof establishes the existence of competitive equilibrium for the economy with the above modifica-
tions.
With the null houses added, the fixed point still exists and the argument that there is no excess demand
at the fixed point still holds. To argue that there is no excess supply takes more care. Suppose that there
is excess supply. If all prices are non-zero, then excess supply implies equal excess supply of all houses
(otherwise the price player will set some price to zero). This in turn implies that expenditure is less than
one, so at least one agent doesn’t exhaust his wealth and must therefore be consuming an entire unit of his
most preferred house, contradicting excess supply. So some prices must be zero to sustain excess supply.
If a non-null house has zero price then all agents must be consuming a proper probability distribution
since it is costless to buy this non-null house. I agents will then consume I houses, and no excess demand
implies no excess supply. Therefore all non-null houses have non-zero prices.
One of the null houses must then have zero price. Other null houses have non-zero prices only if they
are demanded more than the zero-price null house (otherwise the price player will set their prices to zero),
which can never be true since all null houses are identically worthless to the agents. So all null houses have
zero prices.
If the non-null houses have excess supply then, because their prices are all non-zero, they must have
equal excess supply. This implies that expenditure on these houses are less than one. Expenditure on zero-
priced null houses is of course zero. So total expenditure is less than one, so at least one agent doesn’t
exhaust his wealth and must therefore be consuming an entire unit of his most preferred house, contradict-
ing excess supply of the non-null houses.
A.4. Proof of theorem 8
As mentioned in the main text, a competitive equilibrium with over-capacity (po,qo) is equivalent to a
standard competitive equilibrium with the following modifications
 F = H− I fictitious agents are added to the set of agents, each of whom is given a positive budget b f
and is indifferent among all houses.
 Prices are the same as po.
 Non-fictitious agents’ allocations are the same as qo.
 Fictitious agents consume the houses not consumed by the non-fictitious agents.
This proof establishes the existence of competitive equilibrium for the economy with the above modifica-
tions.
I first show that the demand of each fictitious agent is upper-semi continuous. There is probably a
faster proof using the assumption that houses are identical to fictitious agents. The following proof follows
the method of Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979). I drop the superscript agent index for notational ease.
Suppose (pn)→ p and qn ∈ φ(pn, e,b) for each n, and that (qn)→ q. I need to show that q ∈ φ(p, e,b).
Suppose in negation that q /∈ φ(p, e,b). Since φ(p, e,b) is non-empty, I can choose y ∈ φ(p, e,b). There are
two possible cases: either (1) yu > qu or (2) yu = qu and yp < qp.
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In the first case, I construct a sequence (yn) converging to y such that yn ∈ F(pn, e,b) for all n. If y ∈
F(pn, e,b), let yn = y. Otherwise, let yn = αny where αn = ep
n+b
ypn . I know that ep+ b > 0. Also, limn→∞ yp
n =
yp ≤ ep + b, therefore limn→∞ αn = 1. So (yn)→ y.
Since yu > qu, there must be some n such that ynu > qnu, but yn ∈ F(pn), so qn must not be an optimal
choice, a contradiction.
In the second case, since yp < qp, there exists some n such that ypn < qn pn. So y ∈ F(pn, e,b). qn ∈
φ(pn, e,b) then implies that qnu > yu (otherwise y would be chosen over qn, being cheaper and at least as
good as qn). Since yp < qp ≤ ep + b, there exists some λ ∈ (0,1] such that ((1− λ)y + λqn)p ≤ ep + b. So
the bundle ((1− λ)y + λqn) is feasible at p, and gives higher utility than y, so y is not an optimal choice, a
contradiction.
Therefore the demand of each fictitious agent is upper-semi continuous. Convexity is obvious. The
aggregate demand is therefore also convex-valued and upper-semi continuous. By Kakutani’s fixed point
theorem, a fixed point of φ exists.
At the fixed point, suppose that there is excess demand for some houses. Maximum total demand
cannot exceed H, so there must be excess supply for some houses. The price player must set the price of
these houses to be zero. The fictitious agent, indifferent among all houses, will then minimize expenditure
by consuming these zero-priced houses exclusively, spending zero as a result, so total expenditure come
only from the real agents, but then there cannot be excess demand. Therefore there is no excess demand.
If there is a zero-priced house, then each agent consumes a proper probability distribution, and in total
H house shares are demanded. No excess demand then implies that market clears exactly.
If all prices are strictly positive, then excess supply implies equal excess supply for every house (other-
wise the price player will set some price to zero) and that aggregate expenditure is less than 1, but aggre-
gate wealth is 1 + Fb f , so at least one real agent does not exhaust his wealth. This implies that this agent
consumes his most preferred house in its entirety, and contradicts excess supply.
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